First of all, the combined share of market of DKNG and FD comprise 73% of the total. Now, with many of the same rationales that made sense for a merger still in place, such a deal no longer looks doable. The deal went nowhere for lots of reasons, most of them weak in my view. Market was willing to accept the floodtide of red ink because month after month, sales growth was a double-digit spectacular for both platforms.

A merger would have been EBITDA-accretive ASAP.īut Mr. Both showed ebullient sales growth, both were losing tons of money in the process. Both were pouring tens of millions a month battling for the same customer base. Both platforms were virtual carbon copies of each other with strong daily fantasy sports customer bases ready to shoehorn into real money sports bettors. On any criteria, that was at the time, a great idea. It may well have escaped the memory of DKNG shareholders that way back in the early days of legal sports betting’s opening floodgates (2018), DKNG and FanDuel ('FD') held informal talks about a merger.

The FanDuel parent Flutter Entertainment plc ( OTCPK:PDYPF) begins trading on the NYSE late next month, giving investors a true apples-to-apples pure play comparison for the first time.

DKNG will turn profitable next year propelled by double-digit sales growth and continued narrowing of promotional spend-unless newbies swamp the sector with crazy free bet promotions.

( NASDAQ: DKNG) has bullish prospects for 2024, but investors need to consider entry of two deep-pocketed new competitors: ESPNBet and Fanatics.

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